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SIX HORSEMEN OF IRRESPONSIBILITY 
FRANK PASQUALE∗ 
There is now enormous controversy in the United States over internet 
intermediary responsibility for online content, ranging from guns to hate 
speech.1  This controversy often focuses on Section 230 of the Communica-
tions Decency Act (“CDA 230”), 2 which Eric Goldman has called “[b]etter 
[t]han the First Amendment” to protect many online intermediaries from law-
suits, because “a defendant can win a motion to dismiss even when a plaintiff 
alleges that the defendant knew about—or intended—the allegedly illegal 
content.”3  In this brief piece, I do not intend to address the proper interpre-
tation of CDA 230, or other laws.  What I wish to do instead is to address 
synergistic effects rarely commented on in doctrinally siloed spaces of legal 
scholarship.  Namely, what happens when laws like CDA 230 combine with 
or reinforce other immunizing doctrines, whether derived from federal or 
state constitutions, statutes, or common law?  Is there any systematic way to 
reconsider the legal field as a whole, once such synergies against accounta-
bility are noticed? 
 In the course of teaching and writing about law and technology over the 
past decade, I have noticed no fewer than six “horsemen of irresponsibility” 
taking on important roles in technological contexts.4  These include (1) con-
tractual limitations on liability, including exculpatory and forced arbitration 
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 1.  Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Wis. 2019) (holding intermediary not re-
sponsible for gun distribution facilitated by its site); Frank Pasquale, The Automated Public Sphere, 
in THE POLITICS OF BIG DATA: BIG DATA, BIG BROTHER? 110 (Ann Rudinow Sætnan et al. eds., 
2018) (describing controversies over hate speech). 
 2.  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 3.  Eric Goldman, Wisconsin Supreme Court Fixes a Bad Section 230 Opinion—Daniel v. 
Armslist, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (May 7, 2019), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/ar-
chives/2019/05/wisconsin-supreme-court-fixes-a-bad-section-230-opinion-daniel-v-armslist.htm. 
 4.  This framing is inspired by SCOTT VEITCH, LAW AND IRRESPONSIBILITY: ON THE 
LEGITIMATION OF HUMAN SUFFERING (2007), and, more fancifully, by the classic cultural trope of 
“The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.”  Revelation 6:1–8.  The term “apocalypse” in common 
parlance denotes end-times, but is also etymologically rooted in concepts of “revealing” or “unveil-
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clauses; (2) expansive free expression claims; (3) trade secrecy; (4) interme-
diary immunities (such as CDA 230); (5) deregulation; and (6) preemption.  
These doctrines may each, individually or in narrow alliances, offer com-
mendable liberties to technological innovators.  However, they now have 
been collectively weaponized to eviscerate accountability for many firms’ 
wrongdoing (or, worse, have made it impossible for outsiders to even dis-
cover the wrongdoing). Until a new balance has been struck, courts should 
be extremely wary of expanding any of these categories of immunity lest they 
unintentionally enhance their already extraordinary collective effect.   
I.  BARRIERS TO RESPONSIBILITY ONLINE 
For an example of the troubling collective effect of these doctrines of 
legal irresponsibility, consider a public goal as simple and commendable as 
assuring that state actors or powerful oligarchs do not engage in massive ma-
nipulation of online platforms (like Facebook, Twitter, and Google) by de-
ploying bots that emit propaganda or lies, spam hashtags with unrelated con-
tent, or post fake reviews or enable fake views on videos and other spaces for 
user-generated content. There are numerous ways to reduce the reach and 
influence of such bots. However, the six horsemen of irresponsibility, either 
individually or collectively, may render these efforts toothless. 
For example, lawmakers may wish to force platforms to disclose exactly 
how they treat suspected bot accounts. However, the platforms can opportun-
istically deploy trade secrecy laws to argue that such disclosure is a taking of 
their intellectual property and data. Indeed, such expansive trade secrecy pro-
tections already hamstring much of freedom of information law, whether as 
statutory carve-outs, or as potential assertions of a constitutionally protected 
property right in court. 
 Another, more dramatic step would be to ban all bots on platforms. But 
such a move would almost certainly be met with a First Amendment chal-
lenge, thanks to precedents protecting certain forms of machine speech. A 
much less restrictive measure is to simply require accounts to disclose if they 
are run, in whole or in part, by a bot. California’s recent legislative interven-
tion to require bot disclosure is a case in point.5  The law requires the owners 
and operators of bot accounts intended to affect elections or commercial 
                                                        
ing.”  My contention in this brief piece is that a critical mass of immunizing doctrines may effec-
tively end the legal regimes of responsibility they ostensibly merely limit, revealing the fragility of 
legal protections of individuals, with apocalyptic consequences for those harmed. 
 5.  Bolstering Online Transparency Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17940–43 (West 2019).  
For a rationale for requiring disclosure in such cases, see Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth Law of 
Robotics: Preserving Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society, 78 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1252–54 (identifying the “attribution problem” in robotics and artificial intel-
ligence law and policy).  
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transactions, to disclose that the account is not operated directly by a human.6  
But even it might be challenged as “compelled” speech.   
 This California law reflects exactly the type of legal requirement neces-
sary to assure minimally regulable technology in rapidly advancing technol-
ogies.  Still, it is weaker than it needs to be, in part because of preemptive 
complaints about its potential effects on free expression (while the law was 
still a bill).  
 CDA 230 complicates other approaches to the problems posed by many 
troubling bots. Consider, for instance, the misinformation that could spread 
thanks to bots programmed to deliver anti-vaccine content, which could sow 
confusion about the benefits and risks of vaccinations on almost any post, 
video, or article about such issues. Despite repeated complaints about such 
content, a platform may look the other way, perhaps because it does not want 
to pay for workers to review such content, or because it wants to profit from 
it.  Legislators might consider clearly imposing liability to make platforms 
responsible for harms caused by viral bot speech, especially after repeated 
complaints and warnings.  But CDA 230 immunizes platforms from such li-
ability for user generated content, and preempts well-intentioned state efforts 
to impose even minimal responsibility in these cases.  And even if CDA 230 
is partially or wholly repealed, it is possible that state contract law would 
recognize as binding terms of service that included exculpatory clauses for 
platforms.  Given many large platforms’ monopolistic power, such terms of 
service govern broad swathes of life online. 
 This panoply of self-reinforcing and layered doctrines of irresponsibility 
renders federal and state governments powerless to adequately defend the 
public sphere, just at the moment when technologies of deception, manipula-
tion, and fraud are rapidly expanding in scope and intensifying in effect.  
Thanks to the advancing technology of “deepfakes,” faces, voices, and other 
elements of human identity may be increasingly easily mimicked mechani-
cally.  Even “shallowfakes,” such as obvious appropriations of others’ images 
easily detected by a reverse image search, may spread misleading impres-
sions.  This potential for a public sphere increasingly unmoored from reality 
is particularly dangerous as bots become better at mimicking actual humans.   
Despite being protected in the name of “free speech,” many bots are 
intended to make collective will formation and authentic discussion impossi-
ble.  Without a clear common sense of who is participating in the public 
sphere, and how, democratic dialogue declines in legitimacy.  There is a 
growing body of empirical research on the troubling effects of an automated 
public sphere.7  In too many scenarios, bot interventions are less speech than 
                                                        
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., BERKMAN KLEIN CTR., PARTISANSHIP, PROPAGANDA, 
& DISINFORMATION: ONLINE MEDIA & THE 2016 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 17 (2017), 
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anti-speech, calculated efforts to disrupt democratic will formation or fool 
the unwary.  Given growing concern about the extraordinary power of secret 
algorithmic manipulation to target influential messaging to persons with little 
to no appreciation of its ultimate source, courts should not privilege algorith-
mic data processing in these scenarios as speech worthy of the level of pro-
tection traditionally granted to political or even commercial speech. 
To restore public confidence in democratic deliberation, authorities 
could require a license for using certain types of bots, akin to time, place, and 
manner restrictions on demonstrations.  Despite protections of speech and 
assembly in the United States, protesters are not allowed to simply take over 
even public spaces at any time, with any level of noise, and with any number 
of persons.  Rather, permits are often required.  While such permitting may 
be manipulated in untoward ways, such a balance must be struck, lest the 
banner of “free speech” cloak and excuse all manner of lawlessness and nui-
sance.  We might even think of a bot as a particularly noxious loudspeaker or 
long-range acoustic device, often restricted or banned to protect public order.  
Authorities should also consider banning certain types of manipulation.  
The United Kingdom Code of Broadcast Advertising states that “audiovisual 
commercial communications shall not use subliminal techniques.”8  There is 
a long line of U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) guidance forbidding 
misleading advertisements and false or missing indication of sponsorship.9  
                                                        
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33759251/2017-08_electionReport_0.pdf?se-
quence=9&isAllowed=y (examining “the dynamics of the [U.S. presidential] election by analyzing 
over two million stories related to the election, published online . . . [finding] the American political 
system has seen not a symmetrical polarization of the two sides of the political map, but rather the 
emergence of a discrete and relatively insular right-wing media ecosystem.”); ROBYN CAPLAN ET 
AL., DATA & SOC’Y, DEAD RECKONING: NAVIGATING CONTENT MODERATION AFTER “FAKE 
NEWS” (2018), https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_Dead_Reckoning_2018.pdf (dis-
cussing the negative impacts of “fake news” using data and research from the Media Manipulation 
Initiative at Data & Society Research Institute); ALICE MARWICK & REBECCA LEWIS, DATA & 
SOC’Y, MEDIA MANIPULATION AND DISINFORMATION ONLINE (2017), https://dataso-
ciety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline.pdf  (using re-
search and data from the Data & Society Research Institute’s Media Manipulation research group 
to examine how fringe, subculture messaging is amplified in the automated public sphere); LEE 
RAINIE ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH, TROLLS, ANONYMITY AND 
FAKE NEWS ONLINE 3 (2017), https://www.pewinternet.org/2017/03/29/the-future-of-free-speech-
trolls-anonymity-and-fake-news-online/ (“To illuminate current attitudes about the potential im-
pacts of online social interaction over the next decade, Pew Research Center and Elon University’s 
Imagining the Internet Center conducted a large-scale canvassing of technology experts, scholars, 
corporate practitioners and government leaders.”); Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputa-
tion, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515 (2015) (describing effects of automated name search result queries 
on certain individuals). 
 8.  THE BCAP CODE: THE UK CODE OF BROADCAST ADVERTISING 140 (2010), 
http://www.asa.org.uk/uploads/assets/uploaded/e6e8b10a-20e6-4674-a7aa6dc15aa4f814.pdf.  The 
U.S. Federal Communications Commission has twice considered the issue, but done nothing. 
 9.  See, e.g., Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 16 C.F.R. §§ 233.1–233.5 (2019); Guides 
Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0–255.5 
(2019). 
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Such federal law, as well as cognate state consumer protection law, should 
be supplemented to give private rights of action in the case of some particu-
larly egregious bots whose misleading information causes concrete harms.10  
Given the FTC’s manifold limitations, both the U.S. Congress, and states will 
need to develop more specific laws to govern an increasingly automated pub-
lic sphere.  For example, large platforms should be required to identify bot 
speech, to warn users about it, and to permit users to opt out of receiving it 
(or, better, should default all users to not be subject to bot speech, thus re-
quiring users to affirmatively subject themselves to such communications).  
II.  THE SIX HORSEMEN AWAIT 
There will be widespread resistance to such duties. Some proposals for 
preemption would severely diminish the role of state courts.  Other enemies 
of intermediary responsibility would kneecap federal regulatory agencies, 
leaving it up to judges to determine post hoc the remedies appropriate for 
harm caused by AI.  A final facet of “market ordering” would enable AI ven-
dors to use exculpatory clauses in contracts to limit or shift their liability.11 
Even more worryingly, certain constitutional protections for anonymous 
speech might effectively grant a “Ring of Gyges” to bot creators, rendering 
them invisible to potential plaintiffs or prosecutors no matter how much dam-
age they cause.  Some argue that bots deserve the right to generate expression 
online.12  Free speech protection would likely include some right to anonym-
ity, though that right has been limited in key contexts.13  If a robust anonym-
ity right compromises the ability of state actors to force disclosure of bot 
ownership, the First Amendment could effectively operate as a talismanic 
immunity for perpetrators of algorithmatized crime and torts.  It could gut bot 
regulation.   
Even if that particular Ring of Gyges fails to manifest, aggressive asser-
tion of trade secrecy may provide another avenue for avoiding scrutiny.  And 
                                                        
 10.  For examples of efforts to terrorize and harm individuals via online speech, which could 
be automated and put into bot form in an effort to evade responsibility, see CARRIE GOLDBERG, 
NOBODY’S VICTIM: FIGHTING PSYCHOS, STALKERS, PERVS, AND TROLLS (2019).  Other examples 
could include bots promoting impure drugs, falsely reporting emergencies, or defaming individuals. 
 11.  See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts, 69 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (de-
scribing contractual clauses as a barrier to civil suits against technology companies). 
 12.  See, e.g., John Frank Weaver, Why Robots Deserve Free Speech Rights, SLATE (Jan. 16, 
2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/01/robots-deserve-a-first-amendment-right-to-free-
speech.html (“By permitting the government to ban lawful speech, even A.I. speech, we eliminate 
a potentially useful voice. . . . The First Amendment protects the speaker, but more importantly it 
protects the rest of us, who are guaranteed the right to determine whether the speaker is right, wrong, 
or badly programmed.  We are owed that right regardless of who is doing the speaking.”). 
 13.  McConnell, 540 U.S.at 93 (8-1 decision) (upholding disclosure requirements for campaign 
contributions); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects a right to anonymous speech).  
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even if reformers overcome that hurdle to responsibility, expansive interpre-
tations of CDA 230 of the Communications Decency Act might leave plat-
forms utterly unaccountable for hosting anonymous accounts which blatantly 
violate laws requiring attribution, or stricter laws.  
Each of these forms of legal irresponsibility is troubling on its own 
terms.  Deregulatory legislation could compound their effects.  For example, 
preempting state law to put bot regulation solely in the hands of the federal 
government would almost certainly be a mistake in the United States under 
the current administration, and would even be suspect under more enlight-
ened rule.14  To give just one example of the important information-forcing 
role of state law: tort litigation based on state-level common law can be crit-
ical to exposing information that may be blocked from regulators.15  Barring 
some utterly discrediting governance failure, states should be entitled to de-
velop their own standards for the level of risk they are willing to accept from 
emerging technologies (and emerging uses of older technologies).16  Nor 
should they do so alone.  Federal regulators play a vital role in gathering 
information to inform the public and state-level policymakers.  Moreover, 
federal legislation can provide a baseline of protection for consumers, as the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) does with 
respect to health information.17 
Some argue that “regulators could easily jump the gun in regulating AI, 
which would lead to irreparable harm in total welfare of human societies.”18  
A supposed global AI arms race is a frequently given rationale here.19  How-
ever, we are presumably competing to produce safe and accountable AI that 
                                                        
 14.  For a discussion of the Trump Administration’s repeatedly arbitrary and capricious admin-
istrative action, see Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration Is 
Constantly Losing in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/national-security/the-real-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losing-in-
court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html?utm_term=.b08f95f19cbe. 
 15.  Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 
95 GEO. L.J. 695, 697–700, 711–13 (2007). 
 16.  See, e.g., JOHN VILLASENOR, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND DRIVERLESS CARS: ISSUES AND 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR LEGISLATION 16 (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/06/Products_Liability_and_Driverless_Cars.pdf (“To put it mildly, congressional 
preemption of state tort remedies with respect to autonomous vehicle liability would be a mistake.  
Liability for vehicle manufacturing defects has always been the province of state courts applying 
state tort remedies.  That should continue to be the case for autonomous vehicles.  While it is cer-
tainly true that state court remedies are sometimes inconsistent, it does not follow that the solution 
is for the federal government to strip state courts of their authority.”). 
 17.  See Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Infor-
mation, 72 MD. L. REV. 653 (2013) (describing HIPAA’s role in privacy protection).  HIPAA acts 
as a baseline of privacy protection; states are free to add more protections. 
 18.  Gonenc Gurkaynak et al., Stifling Artificial Intelligence: Human Perils, 32 COMPUTER L. 
& SECURITY REV. 749, 750 (2016). 
 19.  Tristan Greene, U.S. Government Is Clueless About AI and Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Reg-
ulate It, NEXT WEB (Oct. 24, 2017), https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/10/24/us-
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promotes a diverse and inclusive set of societal values.  If we are not, we are 
in the wrong race.20 
Another deregulatory strategy would be to “empower” the users of AI 
to contract away their rights to sue.  The deontological case for contracts here 
is that they advance autonomy; the utilitarian case is that we may never have 
the data we need to make wise AI policy if vendors are afraid to try their 
wares outside the controlled environments of labs, without fear of liability.  
However, in certain contexts, a general suspicion of exculpatory clauses 
should prevail.  For example, courts have frequently been unwilling to rec-
ognize such clauses in the medical context because patients are vulnerable, 
may lack the information necessary for a truly informed choice, and may be 
practically unable to switch providers at certain critical points of illness. 21  
The field of AI development is highly technical, and poses many of the same 
types of information asymmetries and technical complexities that are com-
mon in medicine.22  Even where such clauses are allowed, the courts still play 
an important role in policing unfair terms.23  There are certain causes of ac-
tion that should be preserved, whatever terms contracting parties are willing 
to agree to.24 
Concededly, the policy debates in each of these areas are deep and com-
plex.  I can only scratch their surface in this short piece.  But my intent is not 
to conclusively determine here whether any one of the six horsemen ((1) lim-
itation of liability clauses; (2) expansive free expression claims; (3) trade se-
crecy; (4) intermediary immunities; (5) deregulation; and (6) preemption) is 
illegitimate in particular contexts.  Rather, I am focusing on the heretofore 
little-remarked synergy of all these forms of legal irresponsibilization.25  Any 
                                                        
government-is-clueless-about-ai-and-shouldnt-be-allowed-to-regulate-it/ (“Regulation could de-
stroy America’s chances in the AI race—a sprint it doesn’t have a head start in, thanks to China’s 
all-in policy.  If the Trump administration sees fit to place restrictions on AI development that ham-
per Silicon Valley’s ability to compete with Beijing, it’ll lose more than just market shares.  It could 
lose military superiority over countries like China and Russia.”). 
 20.  Virginia Dignum, There Is No AI Race—and If There Is, It’s the Wrong One to Run, 
ALLAI, http://allai.nl/there-is-no-ai-race/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2019). 
 21.  See, for example, Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 
1963), in which the court found a release signed by a patient as a condition of admission to a Cali-
fornia research hospital invalid as against public policy due to unequal bargaining and lack of 
choice, and its progeny.  See also Nadia N. Sawicki, Choosing Medical Malpractice, 93 WASH. L. 
REV. 891, 913 (2018) (finding that “courts are still quite resistant to any attempt by providers to 
minimize their liability on the basis of a patient’s voluntary agreement, or to modify the default 
rules of the doctor-patient relationship by way of contractual agreement”). 
 22.  Frank Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties for AI Development, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2019). 
 23.  MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE 123–42, 138–40 (2013). 
 24.  For an example of such insistence on the preservation of certain causes of action, see Doug-
las Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37 N.M. L. REV. 39 (2007).  Such an 
approach might also disfavor blanket consents or compound authorizations. 
 25.  I understand the aesthetic offense this nominalization may cause.  However, it is intended 
as a counterpart to Professor Nikolas Rose’s account of “responsibilization” in his theory of the 
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one of them could act to effectively eviscerate the force of laws with powerful 
public policy rationales.  Together, they pose almost-insuperable barriers to 
accountability in critical technological contexts. 
Lawyers and judges in the United States are often skilled at analysis 
(breaking a phenomenon or cause of action into constituent parts, or ele-
ments), but oft-adrift when it comes to synthesis (articulating a more com-
prehensive picture of reality, over extensive space or time).  Specialization 
obscures the big picture.  For example, in the case of internet companies, 
cyber lawyers too often confine themselves to recommending that major plat-
forms like Google and Facebook should win key copyright cases, and trade-
mark cases, and antitrust cases, and be granted certain First Amendment im-
munities, and not be classified as a “consumer reporting agency” under 
relevant privacy laws, and so on.  They may well be correct in particular ar-
eas.  But what happens when a critical mass of close cases combines with 
network effects to give a few firms unprecedented power over our infor-
mation about (and even interpretation of) events? 
Similar dynamics afflict finance.  Old banking laws may fit poorly with 
aspects of the new, globalized financial (and fintech) landscape.  There are 
numerous articles and position papers that attempt to dismantle the logic of 
Dodd-Frank, Basel, Sarbanes-Oxley, and other efforts to regulate high fi-
nance.26  But if too-big-to-fail firms keep growing bigger, assured of state 
support, while regulation flounders, the social contract frays.  As a Burkean, 
Oakeshottean, or Chestertonian conservatism would counsel: before upend-
ing a regulatory regime, lawmakers, regulators, and judges should carefully 
consider its purpose, function, and value.  Even when empowered by one or 
more of the “six horsemen” above to limit firms’ accountability, they should 
hesitate to do so. 
                                                        
human sciences.  See, e.g., Nikolas Rose, Government and Control, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 321, 
324, 328–29, 334 (2000).  To build on an insight of Nicole Dewandre’s: We may eventually tell a 
longue durée story of law in the long twentieth century as a progressive imposition of responsibili-
ties on disempowered individuals, and grant of irresponsibility to hyper-empowered corporations 
(artificial persons) and robots (animated by artificial intelligences).  Nicole Dewandre, The Human 
Condition and the Black Box Society, B2O (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.boundary2.org/2015/12/de-
wandre-on-pascal/ (reviewing FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET 
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015)). 
 26.  See, e.g., David D. Schein & James D. Phillips, Dodd-Frank: Consumers’ Friend or An-
other D.C. Con Job?, 2 BUS. & FIN. L. REV. 140, 160 (2019) (“[T]he dead weight of Dodd-Frank 
should be lifted and the agencies already charged with enforcement must be held to a much higher 
standard and actually follow their mandates.”). 
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Lawyers of the Progressive Era and the New Deal dealt with challenges 
similar to those we face today: massive firms that warped the fabric of eco-
nomic, political, and even cultural life to their own advantage.27  They con-
sulted the best of social science to recommend new, broader, and more com-
prehensive regulation.  They may have sometimes gone too far, and each of 
the “six horsemen” mentioned above have played some role in limiting reg-
ulatory overreach.  However, they now threaten to undo entire regulatory and 
liability regimes, and must be reined in.  
The great promise of legal scholarship has been the thoughtful work of 
a body of professionals drawing from many disciplines to offer integrated, 
considered judgments about how to resolve disputes.  Collectively, the six 
horsemen of legal irresponsibility short-circuit that process, particularly in 
the digital realm.  We must be wary of efforts to further extend their power 
and scope.   
                                                        
 27.  Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165, 2168–85 (1999); 
Paul Kens, The Constitution and Business Regulation in the Progressive Era: Recent Developments 
and New Opportunities, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 97, 97 (2016). 
